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Notes
RECONCEPTUALIZING AGGRESSION
MICHAEL ANDERSON†
ABSTRACT
In 1947, the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and
Tokyo declared that aggressive war was no longer a generic breach of
international law implicating only state responsibility. It was the
supreme international crime, one for which individuals could be
prosecuted and punished. On the plane of international law, the
decision was monumentally important. But for nearly seventy years,
the promise it represented withered as the international community
struggled to draw the precise contours of the offense. That promise
was supposedly revived on June 11, 2010. At the close of the Review
Conference of the International Criminal Court in Kampala, Uganda,
the Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal Court
adopted the first precise, widely accepted definition of aggression. But
rather than a groundbreaking achievement, the definition is
anachronistic, dangerous, and unworkable. Its exclusive focus on
state behavior creates an overly restricted conception of aggression
that cannot be applied to the present reality of international armed
conflict. Modern aggression is increasingly perpetrated by nonstate
actors whose nature and characteristics place them outside the most
widely accepted definition of the state. Even abandoning this
traditional conception of statehood for a constructive interpretation
cannot guarantee that the definition will encompass all relevant
nonstate actors. This Note argues that the current state-centric
approach thus creates a backward-looking definition that cannot be
given practical effect without either weakening the international
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system or undermining efforts to prosecute aggression and suppress
global terrorism. Consequently, the Assembly of States Parties should
rewrite the definition of aggression to expressly include both states
and nonstate groups.

INTRODUCTION
Among the four core international crimes, the crime of
aggression—individual responsibility for illegal war—is considered
1
supreme. But unlike the other core offenses—genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes—a historical inability to draw its
precise contours has largely relegated the prosecution of aggression
to the annals of legal history. After nearly a decade of negotiations,
2
however, the international community has made a breakthrough. At
the June 2010 Review Conference of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) in Kampala, Uganda, the Assembly of States Parties to
the International Criminal Court (ASP) adopted the first precise,
widely accepted definition of the crime.
Unfortunately, this new definition is fundamentally flawed: it
3
refers exclusively to state behavior. Professor Noah Weisbord, an
independent expert delegate to the Special Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression (Special Working Group) that was charged by
the ASP with drafting the new definition, recognizes this defect. He
contends that by employing a dynamic conception of statehood, the
definition can be extended beyond its literal text and applied to
4
nonstate actors. This solution is inadequate. The definition of

1. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany (Sept.
30, 1946), in 22 THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY 411, 421 (1950).
This Note uses the terms “aggression” and “the crime of aggression” interchangeably.
2. “International community” is used throughout this Note as shorthand for the society of
states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations that regard themselves
as bound by common rules in their dealings with each other, their pursuit of common interests
and values, and their participation in common institutions. See generally HEDLEY BULL, THE
ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 8–16 (1977) (outlining the
concept of an international community).
3. Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Assembly of States Parties, The Crime of Aggression,
Annex I, art. 8 bis, ICC Doc. RC/Res.6 (advance version June 28, 2010).
4. Noah Weisbord, Conceptualizing Aggression, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 30 (2009)
(“[T]he best . . . approach . . . is to read the word ‘State’ dynamically and incrementally to
include state-like entities.”). In a previous telephone conversation, Professor Weisbord
acknowledged that he did not particularly like the idea of a dynamic conception of statehood,
but stressed that he believed it was the only practical means by which to extend the definition of
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aggression should be rewritten to refer explicitly to both states and
5
nonstate groups. A formulation that expressly captures within its
ambit both types of entities as separate categories mirrors the present
reality of international armed conflict and is easily adapted to future
scenarios. By contrast, failure to abandon the current state-centric
approach will create a backward-looking definition that cannot be
given practical effect without either weakening the international
system or undermining efforts to prosecute aggression and suppress
global terrorism.
This Note analyzes the consequences of accepting and applying
the new definition of aggression, and offers a new approach. Part I
provides the historical background that underscores the importance
of the crime in international law and the difficulty of the task that was
6
entrusted to the Special Working Group. Part II highlights the
evolution in the pattern of international armed conflict that mandates
a non-state-based definition of aggression. International terrorism has
emerged as the greatest contemporary threat to peace and security
and represents the most prevalent form of aggression today. As such,
7
it must be encompassed by any relevant definition of aggression. Part
III sets forth modern conceptions of statehood and demonstrates that
terrorist organizations fall outside their bounds. Because terrorist
groups cannot be construed as states, Part III demonstrates that the
definition of aggression as presently conceived cannot be applied to
all aggression scenarios. Part IV reveals that, even if these taxonomic
difficulties are ignored, interpreting the current definition to refer
constructively to nonstate groups will weaken the international
system and will defeat efforts to prosecute aggression and eliminate
international terrorism. Together, Parts II through IV demonstrate
aggression to both state and nonstate entities.
5. In 2017, the ASP will revisit the definition of aggression and consider proposed
amendments. See ICC, supra note 3, para. 4 (resolving “to review the amendments on the crime
of aggression seven years after the beginning of the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction”). When it
does, the ASP should strongly consider expanding the definition to expressly include nonstate
entities.
6. Because several scholars have meticulously traced the development of the crime of
aggression, the background provided in Part I is brief. For an in-depth historical analysis of the
crime of aggression, see generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling the International Criminal
Court to Punish Aggression, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 551, 551–60 (2007); Noah
Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161, 162–96 (2008).
7. See Weisbord, supra note 4, at 8 (“A backward-looking definition that fails to regulate
important forms of aggression as they emerge is fated to become irrelevant. A definition that
does not fit the sociological phenomenon it seeks to regulate is, and will be perceived to be,
unjust.”).

M. ANDERSON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

414

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/17/2010 10:18:02 PM

[Vol. 60:411

the need to rewrite the definition of aggression to refer expressly to
both states and nonstate groups. The concept of nonstate groups,
however, must be properly bounded; it must be broad enough to
allow effective prosecution of those entities capable of committing
acts of aggression, but narrow enough to exclude ones that cannot
perpetrate the crime. Part V concludes the analysis with some
suggestions for achieving this limited conception of nonstate groups.
I. FROM NUREMBERG TO KAMPALA: THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
OF THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION
In late March 1941, U.S. Attorney General Robert H. Jackson
opined that waging aggressive war constituted an international crime.
“Present aggressive wars,” he argued, “are civil wars against the
8
international community.” The International Military Tribunals,
9
established four years later at Nuremberg and Tokyo, agreed. In one
of the most storied passages of their final judgment, the Nuremberg
judges declared that a war of aggression was “essentially an evil
thing,” for “[t]o initiate a war of aggression . . . is not only an
international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing
from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated
10
evil of the whole.” The import of these tribunals on the plane of
11
international law was monumental. “For the first time,” Professor
Danilo Zolo observes, “aggressive war was not conceived of as a
generic breach of international law involving the liability of a state as

8. Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address Before the Inter-American Bar
Association (Mar. 27, 1941), in 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 348, 353–55 (1941).
9. The Nuremberg Tribunal convicted twelve defendants of the crime of aggression.
Judgment of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, supra note 1,
at 485–528. The Tokyo Tribunal convicted twenty-four. Judgment of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, in 103 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE JUDGMENT,
SEPARATE OPINIONS, PROCEEDINGS IN CHAMBERS, APPEALS AND REVIEWS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 49,773–851 (R. John Pritchard ed.,
1998).
10. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, supra
note 1, at 421.
11. Both tribunals have their critics. See, e.g., BULL, supra note 2, at 89 (“The
world . . . after the Second World War witnessed the trial and punishment of German and
Japanese leaders and soldiers for war crimes and crimes against the peace. . . . That these men
and not others were brought to trial by the victors was [selective and] an accident of power
politics.”); Bert V.A. Röling, The Nuremberg and the Tokyo Trials in Retrospect, in 1 A
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 590–615 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda
eds., 1973) (contending that the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were one-sided and were often
used to achieve political and propagandistic ends).
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such but as a real ‘international crime’” for which individuals could be
12
prosecuted and punished. The tribunals’ promising legacy has,
however, been left unfulfilled. Since 1947, no one has been
13
prosecuted for an alleged crime of aggression.
The greatest impediment to effective prosecution of aggression
has been the international community’s inability to define the
14
offense. Even the Nuremburg judges committed little ink to
outlining the contours of the crime, grounding their conclusion that
Germany had conducted a war of aggression largely on that country’s
history of autocratic governance and its desire to disrupt the status
15
quo embodied in the Treaty of Versailles. Since 1947, there have
16
been several attempts to define aggression, but none have
succeeded. The international community came close in 1974, when
17
the U.N. General Assembly adopted a comprehensive definition.
But the General Assembly’s formulation was not legally binding on
U.N. member states and had no noticeable effect on decisionmaking
18
within the U.N. Security Council. Moreover, the General
12. Danilo Zolo, Who Is Afraid of Punishing Aggressors?: On the Double-Track Approach
to International Criminal Justice, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 799, 800 (2007).
13. Id. at 799.
14. See Rome Statute of the ICC art. 5, para. 2, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered
into force July 1, 2002) (“The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once
a provision is adopted . . . defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.”); BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ,
Reconciling Legitimate Concerns and Removing the Lock From the Courthouse Door (May
2008), http://www.benferencz.org/index.php?id=4&article=9 (“Aggression was included [in the
Rome Statute of the ICC] as one of the four ‘core crimes’ but the ICC was prohibited from
exercising jurisdiction over that offense . . . [because] the intransigent aggression problem was
pushed to a back burner for later consideration . . . at a Review Conference which could deal
with the definition . . . .”).
15. See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany,
supra note 1, at 413–49 (detailing the rise of the Nazi party and Germany’s acts of war in
violation of international treaties); Sabine Swoboda, Defining Aggression and the Objectives of a
Crime of Aggression, 19 CRIM. L.F. 319, 322 (2008) (book review) (“[The International Military
Tribunal] merely underlined Germany’s history and character as an autocratic military regime,
its undemocratic internal constitution and Germany’s pursuit of the political aim of disrupting
the world order as laid down in the Treaty of Versailles.” (footnote omitted)).
16. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974) (declaring
the General Assembly’s adoption of a “Definition of Aggression”); Draft Code of Crimes
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 16, in Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 51 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 9, U.N.
Doc. A/51/10 (1996), reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 42, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532
(providing a definition for the “crime of aggression”).
17. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 16.
18. Sergey Sayapin, A Great Unknown: The Definition of Aggression Revisited, 17 MICH.
ST. J. INT’L L. 377, 378 (2008); see also Ferencz, supra note 6, at 556 (“[T]he 1974 consensus
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Assembly’s definition is too steeped in Cold War–era concepts to
19
carry any normative relevance today. The 1998 Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) listed aggression among
the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, but it left the elements
20
of the offense unspecified. The delegates at Rome instead provided
that the ASP must amend the Statute if it were to include a proper
21
definition of the crime.
Despite these struggles, the international community once again
set out to define the crime of aggression. In 2002, the ASP established
the Special Working Group to develop a definition of aggression that
could be agreed upon by—and thus become legally binding on—the
22
majority of states. At the June 2010 Kampala Review Conference,
the Special Working Group presented to the ASP the product of
near-decade-long negotiations. With the draft definition of aggression
before it, the ASP moved quickly to do what the international
community had hitherto failed to achieve. On June 11, 2010, the ASP
23
adopted the first precise, enforceable definition of the crime.
The success of this endeavor was imperative. The greatest
achievement of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals was clearly
articulating that war making was no longer an inherent right of states,
24
but rather an international crime under certain circumstances. That
important legal advancement had to be sustained, for the crime of
aggression remains one of the most critical concepts in international
25
law. As a strictly legal matter, the legitimate use of force is restricted

definition of aggression bound no one.”). General Assembly resolutions on matters of
international peace and security are not legally binding on U.N. member states. See U.N.
Charter art. 11, paras. 1, 2 (authorizing the General Assembly to make recommendations
regarding “the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and
security” and “any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security”);
see generally C.J.R. Dugard, The Legal Effect of United Nations Resolutions on Apartheid, 83 S.
AFR. L.J. 44, 46–48 (1966) (discussing the binding force of General Assembly resolutions).
19. See Ferencz, supra note 6, at 556 (“[The 1974 definition] reflected the fears, doubts, and
hesitations of its time.”); Weisbord, supra note 4, at 22 (questioning whether certain aspects of
the 1974 definition are normatively relevant in modern times, but not dismissing the
formulation’s relevance altogether).
20. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 14, art. 5.
21. Id. art. 5, para. 2.
22. See The Crime of Aggression, COAL. FOR THE ICC, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=
aggression (last visited Oct. 13, 2010) (discussing the formation of the Special Working Group,
as well as its purpose of continuing discussion of the definition of aggression).
23. See ICC, supra note 3, Annex I, art. 8 bis (defining the crime of aggression).
24. Ferencz, supra note 6, at 565–66.
25. Alberto L. Zuppi, Aggression as International Crime: Unattainable Crusade or Finally
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26

to individual or collective self-defense, unless authorized by the
27
Security Council. All other uses of force must therefore be
28
prohibited by law and punished in court. Benjamin B. Ferencz, a
former prosecutor at Nuremberg, stressed this point on a normative
level:
If peace is to be protected, it is essential that all national leaders be
aware that individuals responsible for the crime of aggression will be
held criminally accountable before the bar of international
justice . . . . Unauthorized war-making is neither legal nor
inevitable. . . . Many great military leaders have come to recognize
that nations can no longer rely on the use of force but must turn to
the rule of law if they are to survive. New forms of violence and
terror pose increasing threats that emphasize the need for new
thinking. As part of the movement toward a more just and humane
world, those responsible for aggression must learn that they will no
29
longer be immune . . . .

The task before the ASP was indeed a vital one. Failure to adopt a
workable definition would have extended to aggressors “a renewed
license to wage illegal wars” with judicial impunity and would have
30
sacrificed the combined efforts of the past sixty years.
Yet despite the promise the new definition represents, there is
reason for pause. As presently written, the definition of aggression
focuses solely on state actors, providing, in relevant part, that the
“crime of aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation or
execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control
Conquering the Evil?, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 1, 2 (2007).
26. U.N. Charter art. 51.
27. Id. art. 39.
28. See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Ending Impunity for the Crime of Aggression, 41 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 281, 288–89 (2009) (noting that the Security Council is institutionally incapable
of remedying all breaches of international peace and that violent disputes are best adjudicated
before a court of law).
29. Ferencz, supra note 6, at 566. Ferencz further recognizes that “punishing
aggression . . . is an important component of a vast matrix which encompasses social justice,
disarmament, and a system of effective enforcement,” all of which work toward eliminating
wars. Id. Elsewhere, former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower similarly warned, “[T]he
world no longer has a choice between force and law. If civilization is to survive, it must choose
the rule of law.” Statement by the President on the Observance of Law Day, 1958 PUB. PAPERS
362, 363 (Apr. 30, 1958).
30. Ferencz, supra note 28, at 290; see also Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 14, pmbl.
(“[T]he most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished and . . . their effective prosecution must be ensured . . . to put an end to impunity for
the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes . . . .”).
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over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of
aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a
31
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

The definition further refines the concept of an “act of aggression,”
noting that it entails “the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the
32
United Nations.”
33
This definition is anachronistic, dangerous, and unworkable. Its
exclusive focus on state behavior creates an overly restricted
conception of the crime that cannot be applied to the present reality
of international armed conflict. Modern aggression is increasingly
perpetrated by nonstate actors whose nature and characteristics place
them outside the most widely accepted definition of the state. Even
abandoning this traditional conception of statehood for a constructive
interpretation cannot guarantee that the definition will encompass all
relevant nonstate actors. Furthermore, applying a constructive
interpretation of statehood to nonstate actors will generate one of
two deleterious effects. If the constructive interpretation extends
statehood to nonstate groups in the limited context of the Rome
Statute, it will create an uncertain international environment in which
a political entity can be simultaneously a state and a nonstate, and it
will violate the fundamental principle of state sovereign equality.
Alternatively, if the constructive interpretation extends statehood to
nonstate groups in all contexts, it will inhibit the prosecution of
aggression by entitling leaders of nonstate groups to sovereign
immunity, and it will hamper efforts to eliminate international
terrorism by granting terrorist organizations the right of selfpreservation. Consequently, the ASP should rewrite the new
definition of aggression to expressly include both states and nonstate
34
groups. This proposal would ensure that the definition is sufficiently

31. ICC, supra note 3, Annex I, art. 8 bis, para. 1 (emphasis added).
32. Id. Annex I, art. 8 bis, para. 2 (emphasis added).
33. See infra Parts III–IV.
34. For example, the definition should read: “the ‘crime of aggression’ means the planning,
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over
or to direct the political or military action of a State or a Nonstate Group, of an act of aggression
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the
United Nations.” Similarly, an act of aggression should be defined as “the use of armed force by
a State or a Nonstate Group against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the
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flexible to encompass the primary threat to international peace and
security today—terrorism.
II. SHIFTS IN THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT
The structure of warfare is evolving. Though some commentators
contend that the state remains an important, if no longer a dominant,
35
actor, the shift away from state centrism and toward a more
36
decentralized form of conflict is evident. As U.S. counterterrorism
expert John Robb notes, “[W]ars between states are now, for all
37
intents and purposes, obsolete.” Instead, “[t]he real threat” is the
rapid rise in global terrorism and the emergence of the independent,
38
superempowered group. Corroborating Robb’s prediction, Thomas
X. Hammes, a retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel, observes, “[T]here
have been major changes in who fights wars. The trend has been and
continues to be downward from nation-states using huge, uniformed
armies to small groups of like-minded people with no formal
39
organization who simply choose to fight.”
With the continuing decline of state-on-state warfare,
independent terrorist organizations represent perhaps the greatest
40
threat to international peace and security. As demonstrated by the
United Nations.”
35. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 126, 146 (2008) (noting that asymmetric warfare is becoming the norm but
suggesting that states will remain key players in international armed conflict, albeit in a different
form).
36. See generally Weisbord, supra note 4, at 13–20 (providing an excellent and thorough
summary of the structural, organizational, and methodological shifts warfare has undergone in
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries).
37. JOHN ROBB, BRAVE NEW WAR: THE NEXT STAGE OF TERRORISM AND THE END OF
GLOBALIZATION 7 (2007).
38. Id. Contra Tim Stephens, International Criminal Law and the Response to International
Terrorism, 27 U. N.S.W. L.J. 454, 454 (2004) (“[T]he available statistics suggest that [terrorism]
presents a less significant challenge to world order and wellbeing than is often supposed, and
must therefore be kept in perspective alongside countless other global challenges to human
security . . . .”).
39. T.X. Hammes, Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges, MILITARY REV.,
May–June 2007, at 14, 20.
40. As used in this Note, “independent terrorist organizations” are those groups that are
not merely extensions of a state. They may be sheltered, financed, or otherwise assisted by a
state. They may be subject to a state’s laws and legal system, whether theoretically or in
practice. But they operate independently of the state itself. Organizations like al Qaeda would
be considered independent, whereas groups like Hamas would not. This Note is concerned
exclusively with independent, non-state-sponsored terrorist organizations.
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September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States; the July 7, 2005,
attacks on the London transit system; and the bombings of trains in
Spain and India on March 11, 2004, and July 11, 2006, respectively,
independent terrorist groups are capable of inflicting significant harm
on the states, communities, and individuals they target. Some, like al
Qaeda, can launch attacks whose devastation rivals the military
41
capabilities of many states. For others, it is only a matter of time.
“[A]s the leverage provided by technology increases,” Robb
forecasts, the threat posed by international terrorism “will finally
reach its culmination—with the ability of one man to declare war on
42
the world and win.”
The rise of global terrorism has cast doubt on the continued
43
relevance of international law. Former U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan recognized the mounting crisis of faith in the international
system, declaring before the General Assembly in 2003, “We have
come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive
than in 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded. . . . Now we
must decide whether it is possible to continue on the basis agreed
44
then, or whether radical changes are needed.” Fundamentally, the
task of defining the crime of aggression is an exercise in adaptation,
reforming the international legal system to address contemporary
45
threats to international peace and security. To this end, the present
definition is inadequate. Terrorism is essentially a belligerent
46
activity equivalent to the state-on-state violence proscribed by the
47
current conception of aggression. Therefore, terrorist organizations
and like-minded groups should be expressly included in the definition
of that offense.
41. See Mark A. Drumbl, The Push to Criminalize Aggression: Something Lost Amid the
Gains?, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 291, 306–07 (2009) (asserting that systemic attacks by
nonstate actors like al Qaeda pose major threats to the international interests protected by
criminalizing aggression: stability, security, human rights, and sovereignty).
42. ROBB, supra note 37, at 8.
43. Devika Hovell, Chinks in the Armour: International Law, Terrorism and the Use of
Force, 27 U. N.S.W. L.J. 398, 398 (2004).
44. U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 7th plen. mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.7 (Sept. 23, 2003).
45. Cf. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 14, pmbl. (“[T]he most serious crimes of
concern to the international community [including war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, and aggression] . . . must not go unpunished and . . . their effective prosecution must
be ensured . . . to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to
contribute to the prevention of such crimes . . . .”).
46. Caleb Carr, “Terrorism”: Why the Definition Must Be Broad, WORLD POL’Y J., Spring
2007, at 47, 47.
47. Drumbl, supra note 41, at 306–07.
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Recognizing the “sociological changes in the character of
modern war,” Professor Weisbord agrees that the new definition
48
should be applied to nonstate groups. Rather than expressly include
these entities in the definition of aggression, however, he contends
that so long as they possess statelike characteristics, the best course is
to interpret the definition’s use of the term “State” constructively to
49
encompass them. The reasoning is sound. The delegates to the ASP
are reluctant to reopen the debate when widespread acceptance of
the current formulation has been achieved. Weisbord’s novel
approach heeds these political concerns by infusing enough flexibility
into the definition to allow it to adapt while largely preserving its
50
original focus on state action.
But this solution is problematic. Nonstate groups should be
explicitly included in the definition of aggression alongside, but
distinguishable from, states. Otherwise, the definition cannot be given
proper effect because most independent terrorist organizations lack
51
the characteristics necessary for classification as a state.
III. MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF STATEHOOD AND THEIR
INAPPLICABILITY TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
It is easy to understand why many equate global terrorist
organizations with the political and territorial entities traditionally
considered states. Not only can they operate on the international
52
plane in ways similar to many states—and often more effectively —
but they also possess many of the attributes associated with
statehood. They are often well-funded and well-organized, command
trained and willing forces, and have the potential to unleash
devastating attacks whose character and scale would constitute a
53
violation of the U.N. Charter if perpetrated by a state. Some
terrorist organizations, like Hamas and Hezbollah, have even gained
54
significant governmental power. Moreover, state officials have
48. Weisbord, supra note 4, at 27.
49. Id. at 30.
50. Id. at 29–30.
51. See infra Part III.
52. LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 306 (2008).
53. See Greg Travalio & John Altenburg, Terrorism, State Responsibility, and the Use of
Military Force, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 97, 109, 115 (2003) (discussing the nature and characteristics of
modern terrorist organizations).
54. Hamas has successfully wrested control of the Palestinian government in the Gaza Strip
from other political parties. MAY, supra note 52, at 306.

M. ANDERSON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

422

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

10/17/2010 10:18:02 PM

[Vol. 60:411

blurred the distinction between these groups and their state
supporters. Addressing the nation immediately following the events
of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush resolved to “make
no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and
55
those who harbor them.” Echoing his superior’s call, Vice President
Dick Cheney warned that “if you provide sanctuary to terrorists, you
56
face the full wrath of the United States of America.”
Being similar to a state, however, is not the same as being a state.
“Since the development of the modern international system,
statehood has been regarded as the paramount type of international
57
personality . . . .” It both implies a particular legal status and confers
a panoply of rights and obligations that do not attach to nonstate
actors. As demonstrated in the remainder of this Part, both legal and
policy arguments militate against confounding terrorist organizations
58
with states.
A. Difficulties Inherent in Classifying Terrorist Organizations as
States under the Montevideo Convention
Though statelike in many respects, international terrorist
organizations lack the indicia that are legally dispositive of statehood.
Perhaps the clearest and most widely accepted definition of statehood
was adopted in Uruguay on December 26, 1933, in the Montevideo
Convention on Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo
59
Convention). Article 1 enumerates four qualities that all states
should possess: (1) a permanent population, (2) a defined territory,
(3) an effective government, and (4) the capacity to enter into
60
relations with other states. Though the product of a regional
agreement, these criteria have developed into customary
international law and become a touchstone for the definition of a
55. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1099, 1100 (Sept. 11, 2001).
56. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2001) (transcript available at http://
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916
.html).
57. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at ix (2d ed.
2006).
58. See infra Part III.A–B.
59. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S.
19; see also Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and Its
Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 403, 415 (1999) (“[C]itation to the Convention in
contemporary discussions of statehood is nearly a reflex.” (footnote omitted)).
60. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, supra note 59, art. 1.
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61

state. Until they are supplanted as the authoritative statement of
customary law on the subject, they should be employed to determine
62
statehood whenever that designation is in question. Under these
four requirements, however, independent terrorist organizations do
not qualify as states. To illustrate this conclusion, this Section will
consider each element and its inapplicability to terrorist groups.
1. Permanent Population. States are inherently “aggregates of
63
individuals,” and no state can exist without a permanent population.
In general, the bounds of this requirement are flexible. Neither the
Montevideo Convention nor customary international law mandates a
64
minimum population size, and the international community does not
65
require that a population be settled to be considered permanent.
Under this criterion, a region inhabited entirely by wandering
nomads, for example, would be as eligible for statehood as any
66
other. In at least one important respect, however, this first
requirement is strict: an entity’s population must reside within some
67
territory over which that entity has exclusive governmental control.
2. Defined Territory. In addition to being a collection of
68
individual citizens, states are fundamentally “territorial entities.”
And as with the requirement of a permanent population, the
strictures placed on this territorial prerequisite are few. Borders need
not be clearly defined or undisputed, and the territory need not be

61. See JOSHUA CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
INTERPLAY OF THE POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL POSSESSION WITH FORMULATIONS OF POSTCOLONIAL ‘NATIONAL’ IDENTITY 77 (2000) (“The Montevideo Convention is considered to be
reflecting, in general terms, the requirements of statehood in customary international law.”).
62. But see Grant, supra note 59, at 434–47 (acknowledging that some authors question the
normative reach of the Montevideo Convention and summarizing the main challenges to its
general applicability).
63. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 52.
64. See JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 83 (3d
ed. 2005) (noting that no minimum population is required for statehood).
65. Pamela Epstein, Behind Closed Doors: “Autonomous Colonization” in Post United
Nations Era—The Case for Western Sahara, 15 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 107, 119–20
(2009).
66. Id. at 120.
67. See Lucian C. Martinez, Jr., Sovereign Impunity: Does the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act Bar Lawsuits Against the Holy See in Clerical Sexual Abuse Cases?, 44 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 123, 149 (2008) (“If the territorial element of sovereignty is absent, the requirement
of a permanent population is at best abstract.”).
68. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 46.
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69

contiguous. Nor is there any minimum area over which an entity
70
must exercise full governmental control. Indeed, Vatican City—the
71
world’s smallest state—possesses a mere 0.25 square miles.
Despite these lax conditions, however, independent terrorist
organizations—including al Qaeda, the most formidable among
them—cannot fulfill the territorial requirement. They persist instead
in a parasitic relationship with a host state that is unwilling or unable
to dislodge them. A “condition of [the] organizational existence” of
independent terrorist groups, writes Professor Philip B. Heymann, is
72
“a sheltering country such as Syria, Iraq, or Iran.” The terrorists who
executed the attacks of September 11 “needed a haven, Afghanistan,
73
that would permit the planning and financing of an attack.”
Somewhere, terrorists must develop their plans, store their weapons
and provisions, train, house, and feed their fighters, and hide their
74
leaders. In short, they must operate from the territory of some state,
75
for independent terrorist organizations possess none of their own.
3. Effective Government.
Even assuming that a terrorist
organization could claim a permanent population and a defined
region, it could not qualify as a state unless it exercised full
governmental control over its territory, independent of any external
76
authority. International law does not specify any particular form,
nature, or extent of this control, but it does mandate that a state
government maintain at least some degree of law and order and
77
establish basic institutions. Unlike states, independent terrorist
organizations are concerned with neither of these goals. They are “led
by individuals who . . . display an utter disregard for both human life
78
and the rule of law.” Perhaps more importantly, the illegality of their
79
existence dictates that they must maintain secrecy to evade capture.

69.
70.
71.
72.
(2001).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

DUGARD, supra note 64, at 83.
CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 46.
See id. at 47 tbl.1 (noting that Vatican City possesses 0.4 square kilometers).
Philip B. Heymann, Dealing with Terrorism: An Overview, 26 INT’L SECURITY 24, 25
Id. at 26.
Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 53, at 98.
Id.
DUGARD, supra note 64, at 83–84.
CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 59.
Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 53, at 115.
Heymann, supra note 72, at 28, 33–37.
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Terrorist organizations are consequently highly decentralized entities
with no permanent institutions, infrastructure, or any other indicia of
80
a coherent form of overarching government. Al Qaeda, for instance,
81
is comprised of “hundreds of mercurial cells” that form “a loosely
82
knit, diffuse, informal network, spread over many countries.” In
short, the objectives and organizational structure of terrorist groups
are readily distinguishable from those of any known form of viable
state government. Effective governmental control, however,
represents the central element of statehood, for it is the criterion on
83
which the other three indicia depend. As such, the inability of
independent terrorist organizations to meet this requirement is
84
particularly dispositive of their disqualification for statehood.
4. Capacity to Enter into Relations with Other States. Finally, to
be considered a state, a political entity must possess the capacity to
enter into relations with other states. Although this power is no
85
longer an exclusive state prerogative, it nonetheless remains a useful
criterion insofar as it combines the requirement of governmental
86
control with an element of independence. As the former has been
87
elucidated already, only the latter will be discussed here.

80. See Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1799 (2005) (“It is unlikely . . . that members of a single Al Qaeda cell
will know of the existence, much less the particular activities, of any other cell; that is the very
point of organizing a movement into a clandestine network of cells.”); Weisbord, supra note 4,
at 16 (“It is less complex to attack a government, which has permanent institutions and
infrastructure, than the hundreds of mercurial cells that make up al Qaeda.”); Meet the Press,
supra note 56 (noting that while Osama bin Laden organized and heads al Qaeda, it is really “a
very broad, kind of loose coalition of groupings”).
81. Weisbord, supra note 4, at 16.
82. Osiel, supra note 80, at 1799. See generally DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE
AGE OF SACRED TERROR: RADICAL ISLAM’S WAR AGAINST AMERICA 167–70 (2003)
(describing the evolution of al Qaeda’s organizational structure and highlighting its lack of
discernable command and control).
83. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 56.
84. See id. at 62 (“Independence is the central criterion for statehood.” (footnote
omitted)).
85. See Manuel Rama-Montaldo, International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of
International Organizations, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 111, 123 (1970) (“International
organizations have concluded treaties, . . . convened international conferences with
representatives of States and other international organizations, . . . sent diplomatic
representatives to member and nonmember States and received permanent missions from
member States.”).
86. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 62.
87. See supra Part III.A.3.
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Independence is comprised of two subelements. The first is the
entity’s separate existence within the international community, borne
out by the exercise of effective governmental control over a
88
permanent population and a defined territory. As previously
89
explained, terrorist organizations can rarely fulfill these conditions.
Nor can they demonstrate the second subelement of independence—
90
freedom from the authority of another state. Although terrorist
groups may be independent insofar as their operations are not
dictated by any particular state, the existence of most such
organizations is predicated on the willingness of states to support and
91
shelter them. The U.S. Congress implicitly recognized this when it
authorized the use of military force against both terrorist
92
organizations and the states that assist them. Other terrorist
organizations operate within the borders of a state that is unaware of
their existence or unable to control their presence. Regardless of
which scenario prevails, all of these entities are necessarily within the
93
domain of a state and are therefore subject to external control. An
entity may demonstrate considerable freedom in both internal and
external affairs and yet remain formally dependent on another entity
94
and subject to that other entity’s control.
Furthermore, the level of independence an entity must
demonstrate is heavily dependent on context. According to Professor
James Crawford, “it is important to distinguish independence as an
initial qualification for statehood and as a condition for continued
existence. A new State . . . will have to demonstrate substantial
independence . . . before it will be regarded as definitively created,”
95
whereas an existing one will not. An independent terrorist
organization would have to be recognized as a new state and would

88. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 66.
89. See supra Part III.A.1–3.
90. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 66.
91. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
92. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224,
224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)) (“[T]he President is authorized to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”).
93. See Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 53, at 98 (noting that terrorist organizations must
operate from “the territory of some state”).
94. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 66.
95. Id. at 63.
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thus carry a heavy burden to prove its independence. Given the
numerous factors weighing against independence for terrorist
organizations, few would surmount this obstacle.
In sum, whether an international terrorist organization can fulfill
these four widely accepted characteristics of statehood is doubtful.
Not only do these entities frequently lack a permanent population
and a defined territory, but they also rarely display the governmental
control and independence that represent the most vital elements of
statehood. Unable to meet any of the four requirements of the
Montevideo Convention, most terrorist organizations cannot be
considered states.
B. Difficulties Inherent in Applying a Dynamic Conception
of Statehood
Because the four criteria of the Montevideo Convention
collectively represent the customary and most widely recognized
benchmarks of statehood, they should be used to interpret the term
“State” in the definition of aggression. Yet the law governing the
96
creation of states is exceedingly complex, and the four factors
97
enumerated in 1933 have been the subject of intense scrutiny.
Although numerous scholars have argued that a mechanical
application of the Montevideo Convention is not alone dispositive of
statehood, most avoid supplanting the Convention altogether,
choosing instead to de-emphasize some of its criteria while appending
98
new ones. But at least one academic commentator suggests that it is
outright irrelevant. Professor Philip Bobbitt, a renowned military
historian and legal scholar, argues that “[t]he State has undergone
many transformations in . . . the basis for [its] legitimacy . . . [and n]ow
99
it is about to undergo another.” Bobbitt inquires whether al Qaeda

96. See id. at x (recognizing that numerous factors beyond mere effectiveness must be
considered); DUGARD, supra note 64, at 82–83 (suggesting that emerging states must now
demonstrate compliance with the standards and expectations of the international community on
issues of human rights and self-determination in addition to the traditional criteria of the
Montevideo Convention); William Thomas Worster, Law, Politics, and the Conception of the
State in State Recognition Theory, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 115, 158 (2009) (acknowledging that there
is a lack of consensus within the international community on the criteria for statehood).
97. See generally Grant, supra note 59, at 434–47 (surveying the charges levied against the
Montevideo Convention).
98. See id. at 434–53 (outlining the approaches of several different schools of thought and
implicitly demonstrating that none rejects the Montevideo Convention completely).
99. BOBBITT, supra note 35, at 126.
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could exemplify this new concept of statehood. Professor Weisbord
responds in the affirmative, arguing that “Bobbitt’s dynamic
conception of the state may offer diplomats drafting the definition of
the crime [of aggression] and jurists interpreting it a way to include
101
acts by al Qaeda-like groups within its ambit.” For the reasons set
forth in this Section, this view is not as promising as it initially
appears; in fact, it carries several adverse effects. Thus, the scope of
the term “State” as used in the definition of aggression should instead
be restricted by close adherence to the Montevideo Convention.
Professor Bobbitt asserts that statehood is based on
constitutional orders and that those orders invariably change when
102
the foundations on which they rest are no longer viable. The
dominant constitutional order today is the nation-state, which is built
103
on maximizing the welfare of its people. To fulfill this promise, the
nation-state must guarantee national security and shield its society
104
from transnational perils. The shift in strategic threats facing
105
states, however, has undermined their ability to achieve those
106
ends. As Bobbitt observes, “Bandits, robbers, guerillas, [and] gangs
have always been part of the domestic security environment. What is
new is their access to mechanized weapons . . . and the unique
political role of such groups . . . . Against these threats, the nationstate is too muscle-bound and too much observed to be of much
107
use.” As a result, the present constitutional order is slowly decaying,
108
and “a new form is being born.” That new form is the market-state,
a constitutional order premised not on securing the welfare of the
109
people, but on maximizing the opportunities available to them.
What exactly constitutes opportunity maximization depends on the

100. Id.
101. Weisbord, supra note 4, at 15.
102. See PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF
HISTORY 346–47 (2002) (providing a graphical outline of Bobbitt’s thesis); cf. id. at 213 (“The
reason that the constitutional order of the nation-state is undergoing a transformation is that it
faces a crisis of legitimation.”).
103. Id. at 61–63.
104. Id. at 228.
105. See supra Part II.
106. See BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 16–17 (observing that the new strategic environment
that now prevails has a significant impact on the state and is causing the nation-state to wither).
107. Id. at 219.
108. Id. at 17.
109. Id. at 229.

M. ANDERSON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

2010]

10/17/2010 10:18:02 PM

RECONCEPTUALIZING AGGRESSION

429

110

If opportunity
shared values of a particular political entity.
maximization is the sole indication of statehood in this new
constitutional order, then terrorist organizations are correctly
captured by the term “State” in the definition of aggression. These
groups are political entities whose members share common values
and objectives, however reprehensible they may be. As such, terrorist
organizations can be said to maximize opportunities for their
adherents and therefore to qualify as states. But to reach this
conclusion is to commit two errors. First, it is to discount another
indicium of state legitimacy that has not faltered with the passing of
the nation-state: the legitimate use of violence. Second, it is to ignore
the widely divergent forms that terrorism can adopt and the
consequent difficulty of capturing them all within a coherent
conception of statehood. This Section considers each in turn.
Professor Bobbitt stresses throughout his work the importance of
violence in the rise and fall of constitutional orders and the existence
of states within them. Encapsulating this argument, he contends that
“[t]he constitutional order of a state and its strategic posture toward
other states together form the inner and outer membrane of a state.
That membrane is secured by violence; without that security, a state
111
ceases to exist.” A political entity, however, must exercise force in
accordance with the strictures of international law: “What is
distinctive about the State is the requirement that the violence it
deploys on its behalf must be legitimate; that is, it must be accepted
within as a matter of law, and accepted without as an appropriate act
112
of state sovereignty.”
The violence employed by terrorist organizations does not meet
this requirement. Although it may be accepted within a terrorist
organization—and without, by similar collectives and a few states—
the international community as a whole has denounced terrorist
violence as per se illegitimate. In December 1984, for example, the
General Assembly, the only U.N. organ in which all member states
have equal representation, passed Resolution 39/159, which
“[r]esolutely condemns policies and practices of terrorism in relations
between States as a method of dealing with other States and
113
peoples.” By the end of the following year, the General Assembly

110.
111.
112.
113.

See id. at 669 (giving examples of different conceptions of opportunity maximization).
Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 17.
G.A. Res. 39/159, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/159 (Dec. 17, 1984).
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had extended an unequivocal denunciation to all acts of international
114
terrorism. With a Comprehensive Convention on the International
115
Suppression of Terrorism currently being drafted, it is evident that
the international community’s stance on global terrorism has not
weakened. Unable to exercise legitimate force, a terrorist
organization cannot secure the constitutional order and strategic
posture necessary to be considered a state under Bobbitt’s
construction.
Second, even if Professor Bobbitt’s interpretation of statehood
successfully captured some current nonstate groups, it is too narrow
to encompass all of them. The author himself emphasizes that “just
what particular form of the State ultimately emerges from” the
transition between the nation- and the market-state “cannot
116
confidently be predicted.” That some formidable groups of political
dissidents will remain outside the new constitutional order is
unavoidable, for although the underlying basis of state legitimacy has
117
evolved over time, international terrorism has persisted as a largely
118
nonstate-driven phenomenon. Thus, it is unlikely that most terrorist
organizations would be captured in a dynamic theory of statehood:
[Terrorism exists] in different shapes and contexts, with different
actors and different modes of operation. When it seemed that the
only kind of terrorism we should focus upon was the global
‘innovative’ terrorism of September 11, the recent events in Iraq,
Palestine, and Lebanon remind us that . . . the plague of terrorism
can become virulent and acute after periods of dormancy, and that it
can reappear with mutant strains, against which antibodies and
119
existing drugs turn out to be impotent.

Because “the same concept of ‘terrorism’ is applied to radically
different phenomena,” capturing each of its iterations in a single

114. G.A. Res. 40/61, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/61 (Dec. 9, 1985) (“[The General Assembly]
[u]nequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever
and by whomever committed . . . .”).
115. U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 55th Sess., Agenda Item 166, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/55/1 (Aug. 28,
2000).
116. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 233.
117. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
118. See Audrey Kurth Cronin, Behind the Curve: Globalization and International
Terrorism, 27 INT’L SECURITY 30, 34–42 (2002) (discussing the origins and historical evolution
of international terrorism).
119. Roberto Toscano, A War Against What?, WORLD POL’Y J., Spring 2007, at 40, 40.
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120

model of statehood is impossible. Abandoning the Montevideo
Convention in favor of Bobbitt’s dynamic conception of statehood
thus provides no guarantee that all terrorist organizations will be
included within the definition of aggression. Some will inevitably
remain beyond the fray.
Consequently, a definition of the crime of aggression that makes
exclusive reference to state behavior will not extend to these entities.
This outcome would be acceptable if terrorist organizations
traditionally posed little danger to the existence of sovereign states,
with the modern threats representing a historical anomaly that will be
erased by the emergence of the market-state. Professor Bobbitt’s own
extensive survey of the historical record, however, demonstrates that
international terrorism has not lain dormant since its ancient
inception, but instead has thrived in its ability to challenge the
121
survival of states, irrespective of their form. From Gavrilo Princip’s
assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, to Osama bin
Laden’s attacks of September 11, international terrorism has
repeatedly sparked the epochal wars to which Bobbitt attributes the
122
shifts in constitutional order. Hence, even if one interpreted “State”
dynamically, there is every indication that the terrorist groups
excluded from its reach would be able to threaten the new marketstate as well. The definition of aggression should therefore be
expanded to expressly account for them.
In short, Professor Bobbitt’s unique understanding of statehood
provides little assistance to those who would attempt to use a
dynamic conception of the state to generate flexibility in the
definition of aggression. Bobbitt’s approach ignores the fact that
many nonstate entities—including terrorist organizations—cannot
legitimately use force and leaves at least some potential nonstate
aggressors beyond the definition’s reach. Whether terrorist
120. Id. Evincing the difficulty of capturing all forms of terrorism in a single definition, the
Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism defines the phenomenon with
regard to the acts that terrorists commit—death or serious bodily harm, or serious damage to a
state or government facility or to public infrastructure, caused with the intent of intimidating a
population or compelling a government or international organization to act or refrain from
acting—rather than with regard to any organizational attributes that terrorist groups share. U.N.
GAOR 6th Comm., supra note 115, art. 2, para. 1.
121. See BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 346–47 (demonstrating that the rise and fall of
constitutional orders has historically coincided with, and been dictated by, the outcome of
epochal wars).
122. See id. (listing the epochal wars sparked by these events and illustrating their
connection with the rise and fall of constitutional orders).
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organizations can be considered states is as questionable under this
approach as it is under the Montevideo Convention. What is more,
any reinterpretation—or outright abandonment—of the Convention
for use in the definition of aggression should be avoided. Although
123
developed outside the international criminal law context, the
multifactor test established by the Montevideo Convention remains
124
the most widely accepted formulation of statehood. Applying the
Convention, however, generates problems of its own. Not only do
independent terrorist organizations by their nature fall outside the
125
Convention’s parameters, but forcing them into that framework also
threatens to undermine the notion of statehood in international law
and jeopardizes efforts to prosecute aggression and combat terrorism.
IV. DANGERS OF CONFERRING STATEHOOD UPON
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
The consequences of classifying terrorist organizations as states
suggest that the ASP should reconsider the new definition.
Regardless of how it is applied in practice, the current formulation
carries drawbacks that militate strongly against its use. On the one
hand, extending statehood to terrorist groups for the limited purpose
of prosecution before the ICC generates uncertainty in the
international system and undermines the equality of states. But on
the other, the alternative of conferring statehood on terrorist
organizations for all purposes endangers both the effective
prosecution of aggression and the long-term success of the
international community’s battle against terrorism. In light of these
challenges, the ASP should amend the new definition of aggression
and its exclusive reference to state behavior and should instead
explicitly include both states and nonstate groups within the scope of
the offense.
A. Risks Posed by Conferring Limited Statehood
Professor Weisbord notes that no one believes that the ICC can
independently confer statehood. Using the definition of aggression as
presently written, ICC judges would instead determine an entity’s
123. See Convention on Rights and Duties of States, supra note 59, pmbl. (stating that the
agreement was an effort to outline the rights and duties of states); Grant, supra note 59, at 414–
18 (tracing the origins and development of the Montevideo requirements).
124. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
125. See supra Part III.A.
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status as a state strictly for the purpose of criminal prosecution before
126
the court. For two significant reasons, this restricted approach is
flawed.
Although signed in 1933, the Montevideo Convention still
127
provides the most widely accepted definition of statehood.
Producing a new framework for exclusive use in international
criminal law risks creating what renowned international legal scholar
128
Hersch Lauterpacht described as a “grotesque spectacle” —namely,
a legal milieu in which an entity is simultaneously a state and a
129
nonstate. It leaves the international community to wonder which
legal status prevails in which contexts. Such ambiguity is undesirable
130
in an international system predicated on order and stability. Not
only is this uncertainty a “grave reflection upon international law”
that counsels strongly against developing a new concept of statehood
131
for use exclusively with the Rome Statute,
but interpreting
statehood differently in different contexts also violates sovereign
equality.
The equality of states is a foundational principle of international
132
law. Some legal theorists attribute its existence to the inherent
quality of the state as an international person. Others avoid the
133
difficulty of pinpointing its origins and merely accept its existence.
Whatever its roots, the meaning of sovereign equality is clear: all
political entities considered states possess equal rights and
126. E-mail from Noah Weisbord, Visiting Assistant Professor, Duke Univ. School of Law,
to Author (Jan. 7, 2010) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
127. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
128. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (1947).
129. Commenting on a previous draft of this Note, Professor Weisbord cautioned that
perhaps it is not the definition of aggression that is antiquated, but rather the Montevideo
Convention. Whether this is accurate is somewhat beside the point. The task of the ASP was not
to reformulate the conception of statehood, but to adopt a definition of aggression that accords
with accepted international law. Supplementing that definition with a special test for
determining statehood risks creating uncertainty in other contexts in which statehood is not
specifically defined. See DUGARD, supra note 64, at 91 (observing that classifying an entity as a
state in some contexts but not in others generates unwanted ambiguity). Given that a generally
accepted definition of a state already exists, if it is to be modernized, it should be done through
the agreement of the international community as a whole.
130. Id.; see also BULL, supra note 2, at 96–97 (noting that order in social life is a necessary
condition for secondary goals like justice).
131. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 128, at 78.
132. EDWIN DEWITT DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 100
(1920).
133. See id. at 101–03 (summarizing the views of prominent publicists on the origin and
existence of sovereign equality).
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obligations. Practical reality, however, dictates that such absolute
135
equality is impossible. The proper understanding of sovereign
equality is therefore that “all [states] have potentially the same rights,
that they have an equal power of realizing them, and that they ought
to be able to [realize and] exercise them with the same
136
inviolability.” Classifying terrorist organizations as states exclusively
for prosecution before the ICC, as Professor Weisbord suggests the
ICC judges will do, directly contradicts this accepted norm. It confers
upon these groups the duties and obligations of statehood with none
of the rights, relegating them to a position of inferiority.
This effect is neither just nor valid under international law.
Irrespective of the comparative size or strength of states, any
137
superiority or limitation not common to all is unlawful. “What is
lawful or unjust for one state,” agreed Argentine publicist and
historian Carlos Calvo, “is equally lawful or unjust for all other states,
regardless of which states are powerful or which states possess only a
138
secondary rank.”
No characteristic can justify the slightest
139
deprivation of the moral or juridical personality of a state. If
terrorist organizations are to be considered states under the definition
of aggression, they must be automatically entitled to every right
attaching to that legal status. To conclude otherwise is to violate
accepted norms of international law. Worse, it is to destroy the very
foundations upon which the international system is built, for to
violate the sovereign equality of states, Italian jurist Giuseppe
Carnazza-Amari observed, “is to destroy the very constitution of
140
human kind and of states.”
134. Id. at 108 (quoting 1 PASQUALE FIORE, TRATTATO DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE
PUBBLICO 289 (4th ed. 1904)).
135. See id. at 106 (“Of course the publicists do not really mean that states have identical
legal rights and obligations, for that is manifestly inconceivable.”).
136. Id. at 107 (quoting 2 PAUL PRADIER-FODÉRÉ, TRAITÉ DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC EUROPÉEN ET AMÉRICAIN § 449 (Paris, G. Pedine-Launel 1885)).
137. Id. at 108 (quoting FIORE, supra note 134, at 289) (“Whether states are great or small,
weak or strong, a superiority or limitation not common to all cannot be lawful.”).
138. CHARLES [CARLOS] CALVO, DICTIONNAIRE MANUEL DE DIPLOMATIE ET DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ET PRIVÉ 161 (Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2009) (1885) (translated from the
French: “Ce qui est licite ou injuste pour un Etat l’est également pour tous les autres, sans
distinction des nations qui sont puissantes ou de celles qui n’occupent qu’un rang
secondaire . . . .” (Author’s translation)).
139. Id.
140. DICKINSON, supra note 132, at 107 (quoting GIUSEPPE CARNAZZA-AMARI,
TRATTATO SUL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PUBBLICO DI PACE 278 (Milano, V. Maisner E.
Compagnia Editori 2d ed. 1875)); see also BULL, supra note 2, at 91 (“The structure of
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Defining the crime of aggression exclusively with regard to states
and classifying terrorist organizations as such for prosecution before
the ICC but for no other purpose is unjust and invalid. As the judicial
embodiment of the international community, the ICC can ill afford to
undermine the system it represents, particularly considering the
141
court’s quest for legitimacy and the “mounting crisis of faith facing
142
the international system.” But as demonstrated in this Section,
developing a new concept of statehood for use exclusively with the
Rome Statute does precisely that. ICC judges should therefore
abandon this approach. If terrorist organizations are to be considered
states under the definition of aggression, then they must be accorded
statehood for all other purposes and with all attendant rights and
obligations. Yet, although designating terrorist organizations as states
in one context but not others should be avoided, the alternative—
conferring full statehood upon them—is equally undesirable.
B. Risks Posed by Conferring Complete Statehood
Treating terrorist organizations as states in all contexts creates
two substantial problems. First, it threatens the effective prosecution
of aggression. The ICC’s jurisdictional constraints suggest that
national legal systems must carry the primary responsibility for
143
prosecuting aggression. In fact, the court is explicitly predicated on
144
the primacy of national courts. If terrorist organizations were
granted complete statehood, terrorist leaders who commit the crime
of aggression would likely be able to bar domestic jurisdiction by
invoking sovereign immunity and thus escape prosecution for their
145
actions. Second, conferring complete statehood on terrorist groups

international coexistence . . . itself depends on norms or rules conferring rights and duties upon
states . . . .”).
141. This is demonstrated by the desperate concern for the court’s legitimacy conveyed by
international legal scholars. See, e.g., Claus Kress, The Crime of Aggression Before the First
Review of the ICC Statute, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 851, 862–63 (2007) (exploring legitimacy
concerns in the context of aggression proceedings).
142. Hovell, supra note 43, at 399; see also id. (noting that the international community is
questioning the continued efficacy of the current international legal framework and its longterm viability in contemporary world affairs).
143. See infra Part IV.B.1.a.
144. See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 14, art. 1 (providing that the ICC’s jurisdiction
complements, but does not supersede, national criminal jurisdiction); Implementation of the
Rome Statute, COAL. FOR THE ICC, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romeimplementation (last
visited Oct. 13, 2010) (noting that the ICC is a court of last resort).
145. See infra Part IV.B.1.b.
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endangers the success of the worldwide struggle against them, for it
146
provides those entities with the right of self-preservation. Both
considerations demonstrate that the only solution is a remodeling of
the crime.
1. Threats to Effective Prosecution of Aggression.
a. Jurisdictional Limitations. The ICC is intended to complement
national criminal courts and provide an overarching judicial structure
that guarantees the effective prosecution of the four core
147
international crimes. To this end, its jurisdictional provisions are
148
far-reaching. With respect to the crime of aggression, in particular,
Article 15 of the Rome Statute—as amended at the Kampala Review
Conference—creates a broad jurisdictional structure that allows the
ICC to exercise jurisdiction when a case is referred to the ICC
Prosecutor by the Security Council or a state party to the Rome
Statute, or when the Prosecutor initiates an investigation proprio
149
motu. But under this complex jurisdictional fabric, the ICC’s ability
to try acts of aggression is limited in two critical respects. First, a state
that is not party to the Rome Statute may not refer, and the ICC
Prosecutor may not investigate proprio motu, alleged crimes of
aggression committed on the territory of that nonparty state. Second,
a state party to the Rome Statute may not refer, and the Prosecutor
may not investigate proprio motu, alleged crimes of aggression
150
committed by the nationals of a nonparty state.
In the
contemporary context of international terrorism, both jurisdictional
constraints curtail the ICC’s ability to prosecute acts of aggression.
Many major targets of international terrorism, including the
United States, Russia, Israel, India, and Pakistan, are not parties to
the Rome Statute. Neither is a host of other countries that have been
146. See infra Part IV.B.2.
147. See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 14, pmbl., art. 5.
148. See id. arts. 12, 13 (establishing broad jurisdictional provisions and noting that the court
may exercise jurisdiction if a matter is referred to the ICC Prosecutor by a state party or by the
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, or if the Prosecutor initiates an
investigation proprio motu); ICC, supra note 3, Annex I, art. 15 (amending Article 15 of the
Rome Statute to create a broad jurisdictional provision that applies specifically to the crime of
aggression).
149. ICC, supra note 3, Annex I, art. 15.
150. Id. Annex I, art. 15 bis, para. 5 (“In respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute,
the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by that
State’s nationals or on its territory.”)
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targets of large-scale terrorist attacks, including China, Iraq, Turkey,
151
and Sudan. The first jurisdictional limitation will bar these states
from referring potential cases of aggression to the ICC Prosecutor
and will prevent the Prosecutor from initiating investigations proprio
motu. But because some major target states, including Afghanistan
and the United Kingdom, are party to the Rome Statute and likely to
adopt the new definition of aggression, the constraints imposed by
this first limitation will be somewhat mitigated.
Unfortunately, the effects of the second jurisdictional limitation
will be much less restrained. If terrorist organizations were granted
full statehood, they would have to accede to the Rome Statute and
accept the new definition of aggression before a state party could
refer, or the ICC Prosecutor could investigate proprio motu, an act of
violence committed by them. This would almost certainly not occur.
Terrorist groups resort to frequent use of force; indeed, their very
152
existence is premised on violence. Because signing onto the Rome
Statute would subject their leaders to prosecution for the large-scale
attacks they orchestrate, and might even jeopardize their continued
153
154
existence, no terrorist organization would take the risk. Together,

151. See 3 UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, at 179–81, U.N. Doc ST/LEG/SER.E/26, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.3
(2009) (listing the countries that are parties to the Rome Statute). See generally UNIV. OF MD.
GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd (last visited Oct. 13, 2010)
(providing a detailed database of terrorist incidents worldwide); Worldwide Incidents Tracking
System, NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/
index.do?N=0 (last visited Oct. 13, 2010) (providing another database of terrorist incidents
worldwide).
152. See Roberto Toscano, More on Defining Terror, WORLD POL’Y J., Fall 2007, at 111, 111
(suggesting that terrorist groups resort to force and violence to achieve their objectives
(referencing historian Caleb Carr)).
153. See S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 2(e), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (requiring that, as a
means of eliminating terrorism, all states criminalize it and prosecute its perpetrators).
154. Some may argue that terrorist organizations, as weak states, have an incentive to
accede to the Rome Statute and accept the new definition of aggression in order to obtain the
legal protections the Statute and definition provide. See, e.g., Ferencz, supra note 14 (noting
that, when drafting the Rome Statute, “[w]eak states” supported the inclusion of aggression in
Article 5(2) because they “wanted a firm legal shield to protect them from aggressors”). Indeed,
terrorism is a tactic employed by those too weak to achieve their objectives through legal or
otherwise legitimate means. By becoming parties to the Rome Statute and adopting the new
definition of aggression, these weak entities might obtain some of the legal protections they
need to fulfill their goals without resorting to violence. The contention here, however, is that the
terrorist organizations capable of committing acts of aggression are fundamentally unique
entities whose needs and desires cannot be satiated by legal guarantees. The objective of these
groups is not to coexist with the larger, more powerful states, but to shape and direct their
policies or destroy them altogether. See Max Abrahms, What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist
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these observations suggest that, if granted complete statehood,
terrorist organizations would often escape prosecution before the
ICC by targeting states that are not parties to the Rome Statute and
by refusing to accede to that agreement themselves. The result would
be that many cases would evade the court’s jurisdiction.
Perhaps recognizing the deleterious effects these two limitations
would have on the ICC’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over
independent terrorist groups, amended Article 15 expands the court’s
jurisdictional reach under two alternative conditions: the ICC
Prosecutor may initiate a case involving any act of transnational
violence committed by any state if (1) the Security Council refers the
155
case, or (2) the Security Council declares the violence an act of
156
aggression. Unfortunately, however, both provisions are themselves
quite restricted.
First, the Security Council has referred only one case to the ICC
157
Prosecutor since the Rome Statute entered into force in 2002. It is
therefore unclear how often the court’s jurisdictional limitations will
be circumvented by this method. Second, the Security Council
historically has been unable or unwilling to recognize an armed attack
as an act of aggression. From its inception, it has expressly

Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy, 32 INT’L SECURITY 78, 82, (2008) (“[T]errorist
organizations . . . seldom seize opportunities to become productive nonviolent political
parties . . . [and] reflexively reject compromise proposals offering significant policy concessions
by the target government.”); Toscano, supra note 152, at 111 (defining terrorism as “‘warfare
deliberately waged against civilians with the purpose of destroying their will to support either
leaders or policies that the agents of such violence find objectionable’” (quoting historian Caleb
Carr)); Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 53, at 97 (“Al Qaeda’s goals are not to conquer
territory, control resources, nor even further traditional political or ideological purposes. They
seek weapons of mass destruction—not as deterrents against the actions of other states—but for
use at times and in places calculated to cause maximum destruction and horror.”). Signing onto
the Rome Statute and the new definition of aggression might protect these terrorist
organizations from attacks by stronger states, but it would also rob them of the primary means
by which they can achieve their ends—deliberate violence against civilian targets.
155. See ICC, supra note 3, Annex I, art. 15 ter, para. 1 (providing that the ICC may exercise
jurisdiction over crimes of aggression in accordance with Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute).
156. Id. Annex I, art. 15 bis, para. 7 (“Where the Security Council has made such a
determination, the Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of
aggression.”).
157. Communications and Referrals, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and
+Cases/Referals+and+communications (last visited Oct. 13, 2010). The Council referred the
situation in Darfur, but it did not specifically allege a crime of aggression. See generally S.C.
Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) (deciding “to refer the situation in Darfur
since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,” but never alleging any
specific crime).
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158

condemned aggression a mere thirty-one times. More importantly,
the Security Council has generally refrained from recognizing acts of
159
international terrorism as aggression. Not even the attacks of
160
September 11 were given that designation. Instead, the Council
prefers terming armed attacks as threats to international peace and
security, breaches of international peace and security, or unlawful
161
uses of force.
Theoretically, this contemporary practice places few limits on the
ICC’s jurisdiction. Regardless of what language the Security Council
employs to describe a given instance of transnational violence, the
ICC may determine for itself whether it and the Prosecutor have been
properly authorized to proceed under paragraph 7 of amended
162
Article 15. But in reality, the Council’s linguistic decisions may
158. Weisbord, supra note 6, at 169 (citing Nicolaos Strapatsas, Rethinking General
Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974) as a Basis for the Definition of Aggression Under the Rome
Statute of the ICC, in RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE SUBSTANTIVE PART
155, 178 (Olaoluwa Lousanya ed., 2007)). Of the thirty-one recognized acts of aggression,
nineteen condemned South Africa for attacks against other African states; six condemned
Southern Rhodesia for attacks against other African states; two condemned acts of aggression
committed against the Seychelles; two condemned Israeli attacks against Tunisia; one
condemned acts of aggression against Benin; and one condemned Iraq for attacks against
Kuwait. Id. Major conflicts like the Korean War, the Six Day War, the Iran-Iraq War, the
Falklands War, the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia, and countless other incidents of
transnational violence were either labeled euphemistically or not named at all. See id. (listing
several major prima facie acts of aggression that were never explicitly recognized by the
Security Council).
159. Not until the 1990s did the Security Council begin to characterize international terrorist
attacks as threats to international peace and security. Even then, the Council never expressly
recognized such violence as an act of aggression. See Andrea Bianchi, Security Council’s AntiTerror Resolutions and Their Implementation by Member States: An Overview, 4 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 1044, 1045 (2006) (noting that the Security Council characterized several high-profile
international terrorist attacks in the 1990s as threats to international peace and security).
160. See S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (regarding the
September 11 terrorist attacks, “like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to
international peace and security”).
161. See David Scheffer, A Pragmatic Approach to Jurisdictional and Definitional
Requirements for the Crime of Aggression in the Rome Statute, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 397,
404 (2009) (“The Security Council rarely resorts to ‘aggression’ terminology and . . . has used
the term to describe relatively minor uses of military force while using other U.N. Charter
terminology . . . to describe far more significant uses of military force classically regarded as
aggression.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 406 (noting the possibility that the Security Council
“may never again” formally recognize an act of aggression); see also supra notes 158–60; cf.
Jochen Abr. Frowein & Nico Krisch, Article 39, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
A COMMENTARY 717, 719 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002) (finding that the Security Council
enjoys significant discretion in determining whether a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or an
act of aggression exists).
162. Some authors posit that the Security Council’s recognition of a threat to or breach of
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greatly affect the ICC’s jurisdictional reach. The U.N. Charter
implicitly distinguishes between a threat to or breach of the peace and
163
an act of aggression, for it provides in Article 39 that “[t]he Security
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
164
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” Professor David Scheffer,
chief negotiator of the U.S. delegation at Rome, bolsters this
conclusion: “The modern world describes what is occurring in the
field . . . as breaches of the peace which sometimes—although . . .
infrequently—would embrace the classic understanding of
‘aggression’ and yet more often would be defined as uses of armed
165
force falling short of ‘aggression.’” Allowing “breach of the peace”
or similar alternative language to act as the functional equivalent of
“aggression” when the two are in fact distinct ignores the intent of the
166
Security Council and creates a legal fiction not supported by
practice. Worse, it risks negatively impacting the Security Council’s
167
decisionmaking process and promises to weaken state support for
168
the ICC. In light of these dangers, the ICC may be reluctant to
interpret these terms interchangeably and permit prosecutions of

international peace and security, or an unlawful use of force, can be interpreted as a de facto
determination that an act of aggression has been committed if the language is memorialized in a
declaration pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. See, e.g., Scheffer, supra note 161, at
404 (“Once the Security Council determines that a breach of the peace has occurred, often by
condemning it, that determination memorialized in a resolution should be sufficient to trigger a
process that can determine whether an act of state-on-state aggression per se has occurred,
which then would enable the ICC to investigate persons for purposes of individual criminal
culpability.”); id. at 408 (“If the Security Council determines that a breach of the peace has
occurred and has identified the offending state in a Chapter VII resolution embodying the
determination, then the Council for all intents and purposes has denied the legitimacy of any
rationale for the use of armed force by the offending state in the particular situation . . . .”).
Chapter VII denotes the circumstances under which the use of force may be authorized. U.N.
Charter ch. VII.
163. Article 39 is the first article in Chapter VII.
164. U.N. Charter art. 39 (emphasis added).
165. Scheffer, supra note 161, at 407.
166. It risks initiating a prosecution the Security Council never intended to allow. ICC,
Assembly of States Parties, Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression, ¶ 30, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1 (July 25, 2007) (“[U]nder
such an approach a Council decision might be interpreted as [a] de facto determination of an act
of aggression, irrespective of the Council’s intention.”).
167. Scheffer, supra note 161, at 405. (warning that such an approach “might . . . negative[ly]
impact . . . the decision-making within the Council, which might adjust the way it used certain
terms”).
168. See id. at 406–07 (noting that the strategy of allowing the ICC to exercise jurisdiction
when the Security Council recognizes a threat to, or breach of, the peace resulting from the
threat or use of armed force by one state against another lacks widespread support).
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nonstate parties without clear authorization from the Security
Council.
The purpose of the preceding argument is not to show that the
ICC could never prosecute an act of aggression committed by a
terrorist group. The court in fact possesses remarkably broad
169
jurisdiction. Rather, this analysis reveals that the ICC’s reach is far
170
from universal. Coupled with its role as a court of last resort, the
ICC’s imperfect jurisdictional triggers suggest that primary
responsibility for prosecuting aggression will rest with national legal
171
systems. Through the principle of complementarity, municipal
courts will be prepared to fulfill this duty. Although the issue is still
vigorously debated, conservative predictions indicate that the
definition of aggression as adopted by the ASP will be transplanted
into the domestic law of those states parties to the Rome Statute that
172
Should the task of prosecuting
accept the new formulation.
aggression fall to them, those countries’ domestic courts will have a
clearly defined crime with which to work. But if that definition
requires that terrorist organizations be classified as states before their
leaders can be charged with aggression—as the present conception
does—and if so classifying those groups requires conferring statehood
upon them for all purposes to which that designation is relevant—as it
should—then terrorist leaders who commit the crime will likely
escape domestic jurisdiction by invoking sovereign immunity.
b. Sovereign Immunity for High-Ranking Terrorist Leaders. By
virtue of their position, high-ranking officials of every state are
entitled to sovereign immunity, both functional and personal. In its
most basic form, the principle of ratione materiae—functional
immunity—frees sitting senior state officials from personal legal
responsibility for any act committed in the exercise of their official
173
duties. Because functional immunity rests on the notion that actions

169. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
171. Under the principle of complementarity, states parties to the Rome Statute are
expected to implement domestically each provision of that agreement. This principle and its
implications are discussed in further detail in Part IV.B.1.b, infra.
172. See generally Roger S. Clark, Ambiguities in Articles 5(2), 121 and 123 of the Rome
Statute, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 413 (2009) (elaborating on the issue of complementarity
and the debate surrounding it).
173. DUGARD, supra note 64, at 253.
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taken by a state official are attributable only to the state, both
175
current and former state officials may invoke its protection. The
scope of the protection, however, is decidedly narrow. A state official
is relieved of liability if, and only if, the official’s actions are
performed while in office and fall within the official’s delegated
176
authority.
Immunity ratione personae—personal immunity—operates quite
differently. Unlike functional immunity, personal immunity is a
177
procedural defense. That is, although an act committed by the state
official is legally imputable to him, the official is immune from civil or
178
criminal jurisdiction. This protection extends to all actions taken by
a serving state official; however, because it does not deflect legal
responsibility from the individual to the state, personal immunity no
179
longer exists once the official ceases to hold office.
Together, functional and personal immunity provide robust
180
protection for high-ranking state officials.
According to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), this degree of immunity is
181
necessary for the proper direction of state and foreign affairs;
however, it also stifles the effective prosecution of aggression in
domestic courts.
Fundamental principles of international law strongly suggest that
all rights attaching to statehood—including sovereign immunity for
174. As the District Court for the Northern District of California summarized in Lyders v.
Lund, 32 F.2d 308 (N.D. Cal. 1929), “suits [against high-ranking state officials] based upon
official, authorized acts, performed within the scope of their duties on behalf of the foreign
state . . . are actions against” that state as a whole, and not against the official as an individual.
Id. at 309.
175. DUGARD, supra note 64, at 253.
176. ILIAS BANTEKAS & SUSAN NASH, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 101 (3d ed. 2007).
177. Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?
Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 863–64 (2002).
178. See id. at 862–63 (noting that under functional immunity, legal responsibility cannot be
attributed to the individual, but suggesting that under personal immunity it can).
179. Id. at 863–64.
180. Functional and personal immunity operate in tandem such that one often fills the gaps
left by limitations imposed upon the other. But they do not offer any protection in the domestic
courts of the official’s state, or when the official’s state has waived these immunities. Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium) (Arrest Warrant Case),
2002 I.C.J. 3, 25 (Feb. 14). Terrorist organizations, however, are unlikely to try their own leaders
or waive their immunities. Those groups instead “display an utter disregard for . . . the rule of
law.” Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 53, at 115.
181. In a recent case, the ICJ opined that “the immunities accorded to [high-ranking state
officials] are not granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure the effective performance of
their functions on behalf of their respective States.” Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. at 21.
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senior state officials—should be conferred upon entities that are
182
designated as states. Thus, if terrorist organizations were considered
states under the current definition of aggression, then their leaders
would acquire functional and personal immunity. This may appear to
pose little threat to the effective prosecution of aggression. Under the
principle of complementarity, states parties to the Rome Statute are
expected to implement domestically each provision of that
183
agreement. Included among those provisions is Article 27, which
eliminates all immunities that would otherwise exempt an individual
184
from prosecution for one of the four core international crimes.
The validity under international law of any domestic analogue to
185
Article 27, however, is questionable. Relevant case law and the
186
writings of prominent international legal scholars indicate that
personal immunity unconditionally protects serving state officials
from national jurisdiction, regardless of the nature and gravity of
their actions. As long as they hold their positions, therefore, senior
leaders of terrorist organizations that are considered states in all
contexts would be completely immune from prosecution in foreign
municipal courts, whether they commit aggression, another core
international crime, or some lesser offense. Once a senior terrorist
leader ceases to hold office, though, personal immunity will no longer
offer any protection. But functional immunity may still bar
prosecution for the crime of aggression.
Whether functional immunity ceases to apply when the act in
question is a core international crime—like aggression—is uncertain.
National and international courts alike continue to adopt differing

182. See supra Part IV.A.
183. COAL. FOR THE ICC, FACTSHEET: ICC IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 1 (2006),
available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS-CICC-Implementation-Legislation.pdf.
184. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 14, art. 27.
185. See, e.g., R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3),
[2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 201–02 (appeal taken from Q.B.) (“Th[e] immunity enjoyed by a head
of state in power . . . is a complete immunity . . . rendering him immune from all actions or
prosecutions whether or not they relate to matters done for the benefit of the state.”); Arrest
Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. at 24 (finding no exceptions to the rule that gives immunity from
criminal prosecution to serving officials).
186. See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 177, at 864 (“[E]ven when [a senior state official] is faced
with [charges of committing a core international crime, the official] is inviolable and immune
from prosecution on the strength of the international rules on personal immunities.”); Steffen
Wirth, Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ’s Judgment in the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 877, 883 (2002) (“[I]mmunity ratione personae, is . . . all-encompassing . . . regardless of
the conduct in question.”).
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187

approaches. A recent ICJ decision, however, hinted that it does not.
188
In Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Arrest Warrant Case), the court
decided that after a high-ranking state official ceases to hold office, he
can be tried in a foreign national court “in respect of acts committed
prior or subsequent to his . . . period of office, as well as in respect of
189
acts committed during [his] period of office in a private capacity.”
Though this reasoning is ultimately dicta, that the court “carefully
examined State practice, including national legislation and those few
190
decisions of national higher courts” before arriving at its conclusion
suggests that this public-private distinction may represent the
prevailing judicial view. Several municipal courts and judges have in
191
fact espoused this understanding.
If the language in the Arrest Warrant Case indeed represents the
dominant approach, and if terrorist organizations were classified as
states in all contexts, then their former leaders could not be
prosecuted for aggression in foreign national courts unless their acts
were considered private. This private-act exception is unlikely to be
192
met, for the crime of aggression is inherently a public act. As

187. See, e.g., Gaddafi Case, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters]
crim., Mar. 13, 2001, 125 I.L.R. 490, 490–510 (Fr.) (holding that sovereign immunity protected
Libyan Arab Republic leader Muammar al-Gaddafi from prosecution for the terrorist bombing
of a UTA flight on September 19, 1989); Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 1 A.C. at 201–06
(holding that former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet had immunity for acts of torture
committed prior to the United Kingdom’s 1988 ratification of the International Convention
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, but no
immunity for acts of torture committed after that ratification); Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J.
at 25 (relying on a public-private-act distinction in asserting that sovereign immunity for
incumbent or former heads of state does not bar criminal prosecution in all circumstances);
Wirth, supra note 186, at 884–85 (describing the case of Suriname head of state Dési Bouterse,
in which the Gerechtshof Amsterdam denied Bouterse immunity for crimes he allegedly
committed while in office in the 1980s).
188. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium) (Arrest
Warrant Case), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14).
189. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
190. Id. at 24. In fact, Belgium, the complainant in the case, had in its domestic law at the
time a provision abrogating all immunities for individuals charged with core international
crimes. Damien Vandermeersch, The ICC Statute and Belgian Law, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 133,
143 (2004). The ICJ found this insufficient to destroy the functional and personal immunity
enjoyed by both serving and former senior state officials.
191. E.g., Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 1 A.C. at 201–06; Wirth, supra note 186, at 884–
85.
192. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, supra note 16, at
43 (“Individual responsibility for [the crime of aggression] is intrinsically and inextricably linked
to the commission of aggression by a State. . . . [S]uch a violation of the law by a State is a sine
qua non condition for the possible attribution to an individual of responsibility for a crime of
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international criminal law scholar Antonio Cassese acknowledges, the
position and rank occupied by senior state officials places them “in a
position to order, instigate, or aid and abet or culpably tolerate or
193
condone” the criminal acts they perpetrate. It would be artificial to
declare international crimes committed by these officials to be private
acts,
for
“[t]his
would
mean . . . that . . . crimes
against
194
peace . . . should be regarded as ‘private acts . . . .’”
Echoing
Cassese’s observation, Professor Claus Kress, a German delegate to
the Special Working Group, stresses that “the crime of
195
aggression” is “intimately linked to state policy.” Without the use of
artificial legal constructs, the crime of aggression cannot be
considered a private act. Consequently, personal immunity will
protect terrorist leaders while they hold their positions, and
196
functional immunity will likely shield them when they do not. If
global terrorist organizations are classified as states in all contexts,
therefore, the present definition of aggression will likely permit
leaders of the greatest contemporary threat to international peace
and security to escape punishment for their transgressions.
Defining the crime of aggression with exclusive reference to state
behavior is consequently dangerous. If, on the one hand, it requires
that terrorist organizations be classified as states solely for purposes
of prosecuting aggression, an exclusively state-centric formulation
creates a grotesque legal milieu in which a political entity can be
simultaneously a state and a nonstate. As applied to terrorist
organizations, a state-centric definition also disregards the sovereign
equality of states by imposing obligations of statehood on entities that
are entitled to none of the associated rights. If, on the other hand,
such a definition requires conferring statehood upon terrorist
organizations for all purposes, then it increases the likelihood that
leaders of terrorist organizations would be able to prevent effective
197
prosecution in municipal courts by invoking sovereign immunity.
aggression.”).
193. Cassese, supra note 177, at 868.
194. Id. at 870.
195. Kress, supra note 141, at 862.
196. The argument here is not that a customary norm dissolving immunities for core
international crimes could never exist. The law in this field is entirely too flexible for such
absolutism. Rather, the gravamen of the preceding analysis is that a core-international-crimes
exception to functional and personal immunities does not presently exist.
197. Judge Damien Vandermeersch of the Court of First Instance in Brussels concurs,
noting that the ICJ’s ruling in the Arrest Warrant Case dictates that the ICC’s jurisdiction is no
longer concurrent with that of national courts, but is “exclusive in respect of those who can
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Perhaps worse, it also undermines global efforts to suppress these
groups by guaranteeing their right to preserve their existence.
2. Threats to the Global Struggle against Terrorism. Historically,
the international community has followed a law-enforcement
approach to suppressing terrorism, a method predicated on capturing
terrorists and prosecuting them under domestic law and in domestic
198
courts. But the events of September 11, 2001, and the new era of
199
international terrorism they ushered in, demand a different strategy.
Instead of relying solely on national law and disjointed domestic
judicial processes, many states have shifted their focus to the use of
200
force against terrorist organizations.
This new approach is
fundamentally affected by a definition of aggression that classifies
terrorist organizations as states in all contexts.
Included among the rights guaranteed to all states is the right to
201
continued existence unhindered by others.
The Montevideo
Convention, for instance, expressly declares that “[t]he fundamental
rights of states are not susceptible [to] being affected in any manner
202
whatsoever,” and thus “[n]o state has the right to intervene in the
203
internal or external affairs of another.” This rule permits every state
to actively defend its sovereignty. The U.N. Charter enshrined this
principle in Article 51, guaranteeing states their inherent right to self204
defense.
invoke their immunity before national courts that have initiated proceedings against them.”
Vandermeersch, supra note 190, at 144. Given the number of cases that will fall to national
courts because of the ICC’s role as a court of last resort and its imperfect jurisdictional triggers,
coupled with the emergence of international terrorism as the gravest threat to global peace and
the most prevalent form of aggression, see supra Part II, this result is troubling.
198. Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 53, at 98; see also John Dugard, International
Terrorism: Problems of Definition, 50 INT’L AFF. 67, 67–74 (1974) (providing a succinct history
of international efforts made since the nineteenth century to curtail the rise and spread of global
terrorism).
199. See Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 53, at 98–100 (noting that the law-enforcement
approach has historically dominated, but that recent events now require a more forceful
response to terrorism).
200. See id. at 106 (“As the threat of transnational terrorism became more apparent, . . . the
world community became more tolerant of military actions against states that supported
terrorism.”). The United States’ War on Terror provides evidence of this transition.
201. See MAY, supra note 52, at 310 (questioning whether terrorist organizations are
legitimate enough to be classified as states and thus to be guaranteed a continued existence free
of any external interference).
202. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, supra note 59, art. 5.
203. Id. art. 8.
204. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
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Under a definition of aggression that confers statehood in its
entirety on terrorist organizations, this privilege must extend to
205
them. This extension, however, jeopardizes international efforts to
actively eradicate terrorism, as it confers upon terrorist groups the
206
right to preserve their existence when threatened. Classifying
terrorist organizations as states for purposes of the crime of
aggression may thus generate enormous policy concerns. From
condemnation in the General Assembly, to the Draft Comprehensive
Convention on the International Suppression of Terrorism, to the
War on Terror, the international community has manifested a desire
to destroy these groups. But by classifying them as states for all
purposes, the international community would be stripped of its ability
to pursue this goal, and much of the progress made against terrorism
would be lost.
In sum, the current approach of defining the crime of aggression
with exclusive reference to state behavior is troublesome.
Independent, transnational terrorist organizations have emerged as
the prevailing threat to international peace and security. They are
capable of unleashing devastating attacks that not only rival the
military strength of many states but that also can be legitimately
207
called acts of aggression. At the Kampala Review Conference, the
international community could not have afforded to let another
opportunity to finally define the crime of aggression slip through its
fingers; however, adopting an antiquated definition was the wrong
solution. As Professor Weisbord recognizes, “[a] backward-looking
definition that fails to regulate important forms of aggression as they
emerge is fated to become irrelevant. A definition that does not fit
the sociological phenomenon it seeks to regulate is, and will be
208
perceived to be, unjust” and illegitimate. Despite Weisbord’s novel
constructive argument, the definition of aggression as currently
formulated continues to be backward looking, for it does not mirror
209
the present reality of international aggression. Even ignoring the
taxonomic difficulties of broadening the term “State” to include
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.”).
205. See supra Part IV.A.
206. MAY, supra note 52, at 310.
207. See supra Part II.
208. Weisbord, supra note 4, at 8.
209. See supra Part II.
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terrorist organizations, doing so either undermines the ICC and the
international system on which it rests, or jeopardizes efforts to
211
destroy terrorist groups and bring their leaders to justice. The
current definition causes more problems than it resolves, and it
should be reconsidered. State centrism should be abandoned, and
both states and nonstate groups should be expressly included within
the ambit of the crime. Only this approach can avoid the negative
consequences enumerated in this Part.
V. PROPERLY RESTRICTING THE CONCEPT OF NONSTATE GROUPS
Beyond political apprehensions, the primary concern with
redrafting the definition of aggression to explicitly include both states
and nonstate groups is that it would create a framework so boundless
in scope that it could not be reasonably applied in practice. An overly
broad conception of aggression would permit excessive prosecutorial
212
discretion, result in liability that exceeds the scope of moral
213
culpability, and rob the ICC of institutional legitimacy. These risks
are particularly acute in the contemporary context, given the
difficulty of delineating the contours of international terrorism. Not
only can the phenomenon be expressed in innumerable forms, but it
is also largely indistinguishable from mere criminal activity. As
Colonel Hammes explains, “[w]e have slid so far away from national
armies that often it is impossible to tell [terrorist organizations] from
simple criminal elements. Many of the former are, in fact, criminal
elements—either they use crime to support their cause or they use
214
their cause to legitimize their crime.” Confronted with these
challenges, the scope of the term “nonstate groups” as used in the
proposed definition must be sufficiently limited.
210. See supra Part III.
211. See supra Part IV.
212. See generally Osiel, supra note 80, at 1801 (discussing the risks of relying on
prosecutorial discretion to temper an overly broad theory of liability).
213. See id. at 1772 (“[Making it too easy to convict defendants as participants in a joint
criminal enterprise] increasingly lures international law to a point where liability threatens to
exceed the scope of moral culpability.”).
214. Hammes, supra note 39, at 20; see also Osiel, supra note 80, at 1799–1800 (“Much
ordinary crime today clearly displays a profusion of global linkages . . . . ‘[T]he growing and
dangerous links between terrorist groups, drug traffickers and their paramilitary gangs’ which
have resulted ‘in all types of violence’ across several continents . . . sew all these into a single,
seamless enterprise of worldwide wrongdoing.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Emmanouela
Mylonaki, The Manipulation of Organized Crime by Terrorists: Legal and Factual Perspectives, 2
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 213, 230 (2002))).
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Perhaps the best approach is to first assess what conduct the
international community seeks to criminalize as aggression, and then
reason backward through its definitional implications to arrive at a
satisfactorily restricted conception of nonstate groups. In this regard,
the evolution of the definition of aggression is instructive. From the
215
formulation adopted by the General Assembly in 1974, to the
216
conclusion reached by the International Law Commission in 1996,
to the current definition, all conceptualizations have been dominated
by a fixation on the state. Even when the actions of nonstate groups
were captured within the scope of the 1974 definition—the only
formulation to ever include them—the groups were considered state
217
agents rather than independent actors. This history demonstrates
that the archetypical understanding of aggression is an armed attack
218
by one state on another. A definition of aggression that expressly
includes nonstate groups can therefore be adequately bounded by
encompassing only those entities that are capable of acting like a state
219
in their use of force.
In determining what it means to act like a state, judges must not
focus on organizational or leadership structure. To act like a state, a
group need not structurally resemble one. Concluding otherwise
would defeat the purpose of extending the definition of aggression to
nonstate groups. As previously explained, these entities often lack the
physical characteristics or legal order that are indicative of
220
statehood. Furthermore, the bureaucratic organizational structure
that typically characterizes a state does not extend to modern warmaking groups like independent terrorist organizations. These
entities are instead based on extensive, decentralized networks in
which one acquires power and leadership not by any formal position,
but by one’s centrality within the network and ability to influence

215. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 16.
216. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, supra note 16, at 43.
217. See G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 16, art. 3, para. g (providing that if a state sends a
nonstate group to exercise armed force against another state, and if that group executes an
attack that is sufficiently grave that it would have constituted an illegal act of war if it had been
committed by the sending state itself, the attack will be considered an act of aggression
committed by the sending state).
218. See MAY, supra note 52, at 307 (“States are the paradigm case of entities that can wage
war.”).
219. Professor Larry May agrees, noting that “if there are other entities that can act like
States, then perhaps they too can wage war.” Id. This would include groups like al Qaeda that
today pose the greatest threat to international peace and security. Id. at 307–08.
220. See supra Part III.A.
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others. Including nonstate groups in the definition of aggression but
requiring that they resemble state actors before they can be
prosecuted for the crime would rob the concept of its elasticity and
produce a formulation as irrelevant as one that excludes nonstate
entities altogether.
Instead, the judges’ inquiry must concentrate on behavior,
focusing on whether the scale and nature of the act, not the group
222
that committed it, is sufficiently statelike to constitute aggression.
Although seemingly broad in scope, this approach is in fact quite
narrow. The ability to act like a state is a high threshold. Rarely does
an individual or group possess the coordination and structure to do
223
anything even remotely statelike. This is particularly true for major
international crimes. “[These] wrongs are radically different from the
garden-variety crime in response to which standard legal doctrines
were developed. These differences rise to a level that may not be
224
merely numerical, but categorical.”
Beyond this general
observation, exactly what constitutes an act of aggression exceeds the
scope of this Note. But whatever aggression entails, only a limited
range of nonstate actors can commit it. And when leaders of those
nonstate entities initiate violence that crosses the threshold of
aggression, they may, and must, be prosecuted for the crime.
Thus, developing a narrow, workable conception of nonstate
groups is not the daunting task it may initially appear to be. The
interpretive method proposed in this Part offers a means by which the
ASP can expressly include those entities in the definition of
aggression without broadening the scope of the crime beyond its

221. See Weisbord, supra note 4, at 16–17 (detailing the shifts in the structure of war-making
organizations).
222. A separate, but related, debate concerns whether the definition of aggression should
include only armed attacks, or whether it should encompass economic aggression, systems
disruptions, and other means of unarmed attack. See, e.g., Julius Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in
the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 224, 224–28 (1977) (analyzing the debates
over economic aggression during the negotiations regarding the 1974 definition and finding that
the issue was left unresolved); Weisbord, supra note 4, at 37–43 (setting forth more generally the
competing sides of the present debate over unarmed aggression and arguing that the present
draft definition conceives of aggression too narrowly). This debate is beyond the scope of this
Note.
223. MAY, supra note 52, at 307; see also Larry May, Aggression, Humanitarian Intervention,
and Terrorism, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 321, 336–40 (2009) (concluding that some terrorist
groups are statelike in their ability to use violence, but most more closely resemble criminal
gangs).
224. Osiel, supra note 80, at 1765.
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useful limits. Now, the most formidable obstacle to a flexible,
accurate definition of aggression is the absence of political will.
CONCLUSION
Since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals of the mid-1940s,
sporadic progress has been made toward ending impunity for
aggressors. As the ASP has now adopted the first precise definition of
the crime of aggression, it should be lauded for its achievement.
Nevertheless, the international community’s work remains
incomplete. In contemporary world affairs, a definition of aggression
focused exclusively on state behavior carries little normative value.
The modern transformations in warfare and the rise of independent
terrorist organizations indicate that a state-centric conception of the
offense cannot reach the greatest contemporary threat to
international peace and security. Even considering the novel
approach proposed by Professor Weisbord, the shortcomings of the
present formulation persist. Encompassing independent war-making
groups like terrorist organizations within the bounds of the present
definition contradicts customary international law, is unworkable
even under new and dynamic conceptions of statehood, and should
thus be avoided. Otherwise, either the certainty and order of the
international system will be undermined and the sovereign equality of
states will be violated, or the effective prosecution of aggression will
be inhibited and global efforts to suppress international terrorism
burdened. To avoid these problems, the ASP should rewrite the
definition of aggression to expressly apply to both states and nonstate
groups. Achieving this new formulation will be difficult. The
delegates to the ASP will likely balk at calls for reassessment after so
much progress has been made. But the legal consequences and policy
implications of applying the definition of aggression in its current
form evince the need for reconceptualizing the offense. Otherwise,
the breakthrough for which many have worked so hard will in fact be
a setback, and the legal triumphs achieved at Nuremberg and Tokyo
more than sixty years ago will be forfeited.

